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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KEITH .J. LANE and
LEAH.LANE,
Plaintiffs and Appellant,,,
-vsCase No.
12868

RAISA W. WALKER and CYRIL
F. WALKER, and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate or
interest in, or lien upon the real property
described herein adverse to the plaintiffs'
ownership, or clouding their title thereto,
Defendo:nts o:nd Reapooilenta.
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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KEITH J. LANE and
LEAH. LANE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs-

RAISA ,V. 'VALKER and CYRIL
F. \V ALKER, and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate or
interest in, or lien upon the real property
descrihed herein adverse to the plaintiffs'
ownership. or clouding their title thereto,

Case No.
12868

Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION OF PLAINTIFFS AND
APPELLANTS, KEITH J. LANE AND
LEA H. LANE, FOR RE-HEARING
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREl\IE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
The plaintiffs and appellants, KEITH J. LANE
and LEAH. LANE, respectfully request a re-hearing
in the above entitled cause upon the following grounds.
I

THE FACTS STATED IN THE OPINION OF
'rHE
COURT ARE NEITHER
ADEQUATE TO POINT UP THE LEGAL IS-
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SUES RAISED BY THE APPEAL, NOR DO
THEY REFLECT THE CONTROVERSY BET\VEEN THE PARTIES, AND THE DEcrs.
ION THEREON IS IN ERROR.
II
DEI:;'ENDANTS' CLAll\IS AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFFS ARE FACTUALLY PREDI.
CATED ON THE THEORY OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION, WHICI-I THEORY IS PRECLUDED BY THE FAILURE TO PAY
TAXES, AND THE l\IINll\IAL FACTUAL
REQUIRElVIENTS TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANTS' TITLE OR RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
UNDER A THEORY OF "BOUNDARY BY
ACQUIESCENCE" A RE PATENTLY All·
SENT.
III
THE DECISION OF TIIE COURT RESULTS
IN A GROSS :MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE,
AND IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AS
ENUNCIATED IN PRIOR DECISIONS OF
THIS COURT.

We, Clair M. Alchich and V. Pershing Nelson,
do hereby certify that the firm of Aldrich & Nelson
are attorneys for the plaintiffs and appellants, petition·
4
ers herein, and that we are members of said finn; that
we have carefully examined the decision of the Supreme
Court herein, and in our opinion there is good reason w
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believe that the judgment is enoneous and should be
re-examined.
Clair M. Aldrich
V. Pershing Nelson

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE FACTS STATED IN THE OPINION OF
THE SUPRE1\1E COURT ARE NEITHER
ADEQUATE TO POINT UP THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE APPEAL, NOR DO
THEY REFLECT THE CONTROVERSY BET,VEEN THE PARTIES, AND THE DECISION TIIEREON IS IN ERROR.
The following diamgram is illustrative of the undisputed factual situation:

P·-1

p

In the above diagram1 "D" illustrates the property
which is covered by a deed from R. V. Walker as Presi-

dent of Weeter Investment Co., to Raisa Walker, def endant and a daughter of Glen P. 'Veeter, who also
signed the deed as Secretary-Treasurer. That deed
which is defendants' Exhibit 13, is the only title, cola;
or otherwise, which the defendants have to the "D"
property. There is no chain of title to 'Veeter Invest·
ment Co., or the defendants.
Record title to the property identified on the dia·
gram as "P", "P-1", and "P-2" is in plaintiffs' im·
mediate predecessor under whom plaintiffs claim, and
which property came down in three separate chains of
title. The "P-2" property below the broken line is the
property in dispute in this lawsuit. The wavy line on
the diagram indicates an old fence line dating back 48
years or more which obviously once marked the boim
dary between parcels "P" and "P-2".
At the time defendants obtained the Weeter fo
vestment Corporation deed to the "D" property in 1947,
they had the property surveyed. Presumably, the sur·
vey description which they secured from their surveyor
corresponds with the deed description which they used.
They did not go to the wavy line on either the survey
or the deed description as being the "boundary" of their
property, although the old fence separating the "P''
properties was admittedly very well known to them at
the time of the survey and for many years prior thereto.
They went only to the property line of plaintiffs' pred ecessors ' and' therefore, the conclusion is inescapable
. to
that even the defend.ants don't claim the fence bne
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be a division fence between their property and the plaintiffs. Their claim was and has to be based upon adverse
possession.
·
'l'I ie owners o f tl1e "P" , "P-I" an d "P-2" properties
from I !l36 to the present all testified that there never
was any acquiescence in the old fence line as being a
boundary between the properties owned by them and
the "D" property claimed by the defendants. They each
said that they always claimed ownership of the "P-2"
property. There was no testimony to the contrary. They
have paid all taxes assessed against the property, which
taxes have always been assessed separately from the
"D" , "I::t" , an<l "I>-I" parce l s.
In their pleadings, defendants originally claimed
ownership of the "P-2" property on the theory of adverse possession. But, at the time of the trial, presumably for the reason that plaintiffs have always paid the
taxes on the property and defendants have never paid
any taxes whatever, defendants changed their theory to
"llOW1tIary by acqmescence
.
".
N otwithstan<ling the change in theory, however,
defendants' evidence went solely to matters of "adverse
possession", and there is not one scintilla of evidence in
the record suggesting or supporting any fiction that
the previous owners or claimants erected the old fence
to establish the correct boundary between parcels "D"
and "P".
The court's opinion implies that an increase in prop-
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erty values suddenly impelled the plaintiffs to claim
property which for numerous years previous thereto
they had been willing to let their neigh hors have. Such is
simply not the case. In the first place, there is not one
iota of evidence that the values of the property in the
area where these properties are located have increased,
or if they have increased, that the increased values are
or were any motivation to the plaintiffs to bring this
action. The facts are that under the courts' decision,
the home of the plaintiffs is now some two or three feet
from their property line, while the home of the defend·
ants is some 41/ feet from their property line, and the:
close proximity of plaintiffs' home to the defendants'
property line substantially interferes with the plaintiffs
use and occupancy of their home. Defendants have con·
structed a clothes line practically on the property line,
just a few feet from plaintiffs' window which is an·
noying to plaintiffs to put it mildly.

POINT II
DEFENDANTS' CLAll\IS AGAINST THE
PLAINTII•-.FS ARE FACTUALLY PREDl·
GATED ON THE THEORY OF ADVEHS};
POSSESSION, WHICII THEORY IS ;PRECLUDED BY THE FAILURE TO PAY
TAXES, AND THE :MINI.MAL FACTUAL
TO SUSTAIN DEFEND·
ANTS' TITLE OR RIGHT TO POSSESSION

7

UNDER A THEORY OF "BOUNDARY BY
ACQUIESCENCE" ARE PATENTLY ABS
If the facts claimed by the defendants are carefully analyzed, their thrust is that defendants and their
predecessors have occupied the "P-2" property adverse
to the true owner for more than 48 years, and defendants have thereby acquired title. This theory might be
valid if it were not for Sections 78-12-11 and 78-12-12,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which among other things,
requires the payment of all taxes levied and assessed
against the property which, of course, defendants have
not done. There arc no facts whatever which could even
remotely suggest, sustain, or support any fiction that
sometime, somehow, somewhere, the true boundary between adjoining land owners was in dispute and the
correct boundary was marked by a fence and then acquiesced in as the boundary between them. This case is not
a "boundary by acquiescence" situation because the
fence does not now and never has marked anything but
a boundary between two parcels of property always
owned by the plaintiffs and their predecessors, never
owned by the defendants, and never acquiesced in by
either plaintiffs or defendants as anything more than
.
a f ence separatmg
parce1s "P" an d "P-2".

POINT III

THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS
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IN A GROSS MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
AND IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AS
ENUNCIATED IN PRIOR DECISIONS OF
THIS COURT.

J

The court has held in effect that a "squatter" who
has no record title whatever, and who has never paid any
taxes on the land, and who moves up to an old fence
line existing between two parcels of property owned by
his neighbor, can prevail over his neighbor who is a rec·
ord owner of the property, and who has paid a valuable
consideration for it, who has always paid the taxes thereon, and who at all times has believed, knows, and un·
derstands, that the fence line marks nothing except a
division of his own property. It is submitted that under
the factual situation of this case, there is no rule of law
or requirement of justice compelling plaintiffs to go
to court to retain title to their property as against a
neighbor who plants a few shrubs and constructs a
clothes line on it, so long as they pay the taxes assessed
against it. None of the cases referred to in the briefs
heretofore submitted by the parties hold otherwise.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is the plaintiffs and appellants
position that in the interest of equity and fairness they
ought to have the opportunity to further present and
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fully argue the matters to the court. For this purpose,
a re-hearing is respectfully requested.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff1
anzd Appellants
43 East 200 N ortll
Provo, Utah 84601

Clair M. Aldrich
V. Pershing Nelson

